“To borrow an expression from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, whose analysis of the place of pragmatics in language is part of the inspiration for this discussion, the problem with the purely formal conception of the algorithm as an abstract machine is not that it is abstract. It is that it is not abstract enough. That is to say, it is not capable of understanding the place of the algorithm in a process which traverses machine and human.” Deleuze’s pragmatic space Goffey refers to, is described as a breach from deconstructionist or post-modern linguistic strategies. Deleuze and Guattari argue that language is not about the transmission of meaning, but fundamentally about “action”. This critique of a linguistics fixed on the production of meaning through language, as being not abstract enough to account for the dynamic of human action, the act of speech, social action, etc etc, is appropriately tied to Foucault’s notion of the statement as not being analytically reducible to the syntactic of language; “it refers instead to its historical existence…”. A few chapter’s later in Kittler’s Code (or, How You Can Write Something Differently), we’re given a sketch of such a historical existence, by examining the development and trajectory of coding practices, encryption and of course the 1936 Turing Machine, by Alan Turing, that made critical breakthrough in computing machines. Code, hints at an engineering aesthetic of efficiency or elegance with the input output relations of encryption, that the output should be greater then the input. It’s from this place of historical existence that computational coding practices, are conceptualized as processes or a series of defined commands. Such a literature is explicitly for the production of machine/human action, a clear parallel to Deleuze’s critique of language.